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FOREWORD
As the title of this paper states Botswana faces urgent 
needs to create employment opportunities for its citizens 
and to improve income opportunities while at the same time 
the Government’s fiscal means are rapidly growing with 
revenues from mineral developments. The basic concerns 
of this paper follow closely the theme developed by Professor 
Steven Lewis in his 1977 IDM lecture where he discussed 
"Balanced Development in Resource Rich Countries".
The authors appraise the economic characteristics and 
potential of Botswana’s major productive sectors - cattle, 
mining, and agriculture - and examine the basic constraints 
which operate in terms of generating employment opportunities. 
The paper concludes with an assessment pf an arable lands 
program (ALDEP) and suggest various policy alternatives that 
could funnel resources towards arable development in order to 
create employment opportunities and raise the standard of 
living of the rural poor. The paper is particularly relevant 
at this time as the Government embarks on implementing 
NDP 3T which stresses employment creation and arable 
agriculture.
The authors assume responsibility for the contents of the 
paper. This paper will also be published as Occasional 
paper No. 4., School of Development Studies, University 
of East Anglia. By this publication the IDM is pleased 
to assist the distribution of these findings in the BLS 
region.
James G. Campbell 
Asst. Director.
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POVERTY IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY : PROBLEMS OF CREATING INCOMES AND
EMPLOYMENT IN BOTSWANA.
I. Livingstone and R.K. Srivastava*
The purpose of this article is diagnostic: to diagnose the main 
elements of the development problem in Botswana and to present these 
elements, perhaps with some risk of simplification, in a starker and 
more coherent form than may have been done hitherto. It is argued that, 
despite genuine and valuable efforts by the Botswana government at 
securing wider participation in the benefits of growth, there exist certain 
basic structural and social factors which make this difficult and which 
instead generate 'inequality with growth'.
Recent Economic Development
Until comparatively recently Botswana could have been described 
simply as a 'livestock economy', cattle-raising being the main source 
of cash- income and, for the country, of exports and foreign exchange.
At Independence in 1966 the share of agriculture in GDP was 40 per cent, 
largely due to cattle - keeping, and of mining just one per cent. In 
1976-77 agriculture's share was 25 per cent (Table 1.), of which thiee-
Tablel. Structure of the GDP (Percentages)
Estimated
1976-77
Forecast
1984-05
Agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting 25 13
Mining, quarrying and prospecting 12 36
Manufacturing 5 5
Water and electricity 3 3
Construction 6 5
Trade, hotels and restaurants 22 13
Transport and communications 3 2
Finance, insurance, business services, real 
estate, community and personal services 13 10
General government 11 13
100 lOO
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Forecast for the 
National Development Plan (NDP V), September 1979 (mimeo).
* University of East Anglia and International Labour Office respectively. '
The authors were members of an IFAD Special Programming Mission to Botswana 
in September 1979 but this paper has been written in their personal capacities 
only and does not draw on the work of the mission to any significant extent.
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quarters was accounted for by cattle-raising, reflecting the low value
and low productivity of arable farming as well as the importance of
commercial ranching. Mining, based on diamonds, with some contribution
from nickel-copper, had increased its share rapidly to 12 per cent.
Botswana was thus described in a World Bank report of 1975 as "a mining-
led, rapidly expanding urbanizing economy with a high rate of growth".
Certainly Botswana had experienced extremely rapid economic growth after
Independence. In the 10 years up to 1976-77 GDP grew at an annual rate
of nearly 20 per cent in nominal terms, equivalent to some 15 per cent 
1m  real terms.
The increase in mineral production should not, however, be allowed 
to obscure the tremendous expansion which also occurred in the pastoral 
economy. It is important to understand the basis of this expansion as 
the functioning of a pastoral economy (particularly the impact of 
investment therein) is frequently only partially understood, and trends 
and permanent changes are generally obscured by periodic droughts and 
catastrophes.
A pastoral economy, reduced to its essentials, depends upon two 
complementary inputs (apart from the basic infrastructural input of 
veterinary services to safeguard health), grass and water supplies. The 
former, which depends directly on the incidence of rainfall, is useless 
without the other: but judicious introduction of water supplies in 
previously unused areas can greatly increase the amount of effective 
grazing available. In Botswana this is precisely what has occurred: 
a massive programme of public and private borehole drilling has taken 
place, permitting expansion of the livestock economy, particularly to 
the west, as the number of boreholes increased to an estimated 6,800 in
1978. Between the mid-1960's and mid-1970's the area of accessible land 
approximately doubled and this, alongside the development of commercial 
ranching, permitted the size of the national herd to double or treble 
from a rough estimate of l-lh million in 1966 to some 3*2 million in 
1979.2
Limits to the geographical extension of livestock production are said 
to be being neared now, however, with overgrazing in many places, even 
if systematic investigation of these limits in terms of water availability
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and potential grazing has not actually been carried out. However
mineral resources have continued to bring more wealth to the country
and promise a veritable bonanza in the future. A major new spurt will
occur in 1982-83 when a new diamond mine at Jwaneng comes into operation./
The mine has been described as being the sort of find that might bei
expected no more than once in 50 years. From Table 1 it can be seen 
that the share of mining in GDP could triple to 36 per cent (compared 
to 12 per cent in 1976-77)* while the value of GDP itself maY increase by 
as much as one third in two years.
This will mean a correspondingly great increase in foreign exchange 
earnings, in a situation which was already very healthy. Botswana's 
official exchange reserves have increased from P36 million in September, 
1976, to P179 million at end - July 1979, and were expected to amount to 
over 9 months' expenditure on imports by the end of the year. Similarly 
government revenue can be expected to increase, by about 40 - 45 per4
cent over 5 years, as indicated in Table 2, due mainly to the increase 
in mineral revenue of some 130 per cent. In addition to this Botswana, 
for reasons not unrelated to its strategic importance associated with 
a location in the middle of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia,
Table 2. Estimated Government Revenue and Expenditure 
(Millions of Pula 1979-80 prices)
1979-80 1984-85
Customs revenue 73. 7 84.4
Mineral revenue 63. 2 143.4
Other revenue 78. 3 80. 8
Total 215. 2 308 .6
Recurrent expenditure 118. 5 192.6
Development expenditure 68. 7 82.7
Net lending for development 17. 2 28,1
Total 204. 4 303,4
Budget surplus + 10 .8 + .5 ,2
Source: As Table 1.
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may bo described nob just as liquid, but almost awash with offers oi
foreign assistance. This handy situation exists when Botswana already
has virtually universal primary education for its small school-age
population, reducing one obvious outlet for spare funds. In 1979, in
fact, Botswana was near to financing its own very high rate of
investment, equal to 30 per cent of GDP: foreign financial assistance
appeared not to be increasing the country's investment effort so much
3as allowing Botswana to augment its already ample reserves.
This increase in wealth and income is particularly significant
when set against the small size of Botswana's population of only
800,000. It produced an average per capita income in 1979 approaching
$800 per annum. The dominance of mineral wealth and the comparative
smallness of the population gives Botswana all the characteristics now
of an 'oil economy' (see Seers,1959 ), a high-value mineral-exploiting
activity with few linkages with the rest of the economy and an attendant
problem of how to distribute the benefits from such wealth more widely.
We could almost go beyond this, referring to the high growth rates
already cited, and discuss Botswana as a case of 'growth without
development': 'almost' because this would be unfair in the light of
genuine efforts at wider development by the Botswana government and
outside agencies, particularly under the Accelerated Rural Development
Programme (ARDP). However ARDP concentrated particularly on infrastructure
(building and construction) in the rural centres and social services
4(rural clinics and primary schools) rather than generating income 
opportunities and employment for the population as a whole (Chambers,
1977 see also Chambers and Feldman, 1973 ). Despite the benefits 
obtained in this direction, the distribution of income and wealth in 
Botswana remains highly skewed, and the economic status of certain 
strongly disadvantaged groups has actually been deteriorating and may 
continue to do so. It is useful to discuss this economic status first 
in terms of income and wealth and second in terms of employment 
opportunities.
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Present Distribution of Income and Wealth
Approximately 85 per cent of Botswana's population can be classed 
as rural, so that the comparatively systematic Rural Income Distribution 
Survey (RIDS) of 1974-75 covers a large proportion of the population.
The Survey reported the median rural household income in 1974 as P63Q:5 
but while the poorest decile had a mean annual income of only P130, the 
highest decile received as much as P3,400, 26 times as much. The top 
10, per cent of households received almost 40 per cent of total rural 
income while the bottom 10 per cent received only an estimated 1 .5 per 
cent of income, as shown in Table 3, similarly, the top 5 per cent of
Table 3. The Distribution of Total Rural Income
Percentile 
Income Group
% Total
Income Received
Mean Annual 
Income (Pula)
Lowest 10% 1.5 129
10 - 20%
A
2.5 219
20 - 30% 3.4 298
30 - 40% 4.4 385
40 - 50% 5.5 483
50 - 60% 7 . i 616
Sub-Total Lowest 60% 24.4 -
60 - 70% 8.9 777
70 - 80% 1 1 . 1 970
80 - 90% 16.8 1468
Highest 10% 38.8 3390
Highest 5% 26.2 4485
All Income Groups 100.0
Notes:
1. Based on Table 
P. Fallon, WEP
2 in "Rural Poverty in Botswana" by C. 
10-6/WP26, ILO, Geneva, July 1979.
Colclough and
2. Ratio of mean annual income of highest 10% to lowest 10% - 26.29 
times.
3. Highest 5% received 26.2% of total income, while the lowest 60% 
received 24.4%
4. All data in the RIDS were valued in Rands. In 1976 Botswana introduced 
its own currency - Pula, and Pula and Rand were at par until mid-September
1979.
I
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Table 4. Distribution of Households by Per Capita Incomes, 1974-75.
Per capita income No. of households Percentage
P 0 - 4 8 6,980 10
48 - 96 28,360 31
96 -192 26,120 29
192 -384 16,740 18
384 -768 8,100 7
P768+ 4,230 5
90,630 100
Source: RIDS - Further Analysis, C.S.O., Statistical Bulletin, March, 1979
households received a higher share of total income than the bottom 60 
per cent. Corresponding information is given in Table 4.
Despite the establishment of a good network of rural health facilities, 
low levels of health, together with malnutrition,,are widespread. Initial 
results from nutrition surveys indicate that at the end of 1978 some 25 
per cent of the pre-school population could be regarded as 'at risk' in 
nutritional terms, and in July, 1979, a figure of 30 per cent was quoted. 
Protein - energy malnutrition was estimated to be 19 per cent in some 
rural areas. Infant mortality is high, wi'th a national average of 122,
going up to nearly_200 in remoter-areas such as Ngamiland.
Rural incomes and poverty are highly correlated with livestock 
ownership. Although the rural economy in Botswana may be said to be 
predominantly pastoral, in 1974, according to the RIDS, about 5 per cent 
of rural households owned about 50 per cent of the national herd, while 
about 45 per cent owned no cattle at all. More details are given in 
Table 5. This shows that 90 per cent of households owned 20 per cent 
of the cattle and the top one per cent of households 27 per cent of 
the cattle, the commercial sector included. Table 6 , based on information 
obtained from agricultural surveys, offers supporting evidence while 
Figure 1 presents a summary of the RIDS data in graphical form.
One factor slightly moderating the skewed distribution of livestock
is the prevalent system of mafisa, in which owners place some of their 
livestock in the care of others who lack or have lost their animals.
- 6a -
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Table 5 . Distribution of Cattle Holdings 1974-75.
% Households Cumulative % Cattle Owned Cumulative %
% Households Cattle Owned
45 45 0.0 0 .0
5 50 0.5 0.5
25 75 14.5 15.0
15 90 20.0 35.0
5 95 15.0 50.0
4 99 23.0 73.0
0.6 99.6 10.0 83.0
0.4 100.0 17.0 100.0
Notes: Based on Rural Income Distribution Survey - Further Analysis
Central Statistical Office, Gaborone, May 1979.
The holder is normally permitted to keep the first calf born and has the 
right to milk produced, meat from the carcasses and, commonly in Botswana,
.4
the right to use the cattle for draught purposes (for which ox teams may 
also be specifically borrowed or hired). The system would appear to be 
directed towards offering marginal households a subsistence level of 
existence rather than to correct inequalities in wealth, since such an 
arrangement would hardly permit recipients to build up their own cattle 
herds, whereas it would tend to safeguard that of the donor. It does 
mean that a distinction needs to be made between the distribution of 
cattle ownership and the distribution of cattle holdings. But, as Table 6 
shows, the difference is not very great.
Table 6 . Proportion of Agricultural Households without Cattle.
Year No. of Agricultural 
Households ('000)
% Not Owning 
Cattle
% Not Holding 
Cattle
1968-69 48 30 29
1970-71 52 25 23
1971-72 64 32 30
1974-75 80 37 32
1975-76 80 39 36
Notes: The estimate of agricultural households is derived from the surveys 
of agriculture. The estimates of households not owning or holding 
cattle are approximate, and the difference between them represents 
the share of the "mafisa system".
Based on C. Colclough and S. McCarthy: The Political Economy of 
Botswana - A Study of Growth and Distribution, Oxford, forthcoming.
The data available also shows clearly that poorer households are 
more likely to own goats and sheep than cattle. Thus Table 7 shows 
(row 1 ) 45 per cent of households lack cattle and (column 1) only 21
Table 7 . Number of Rural Households by Cattle Owned and Small Stock 
Owned, 1974-75 (no.\percent)
Holding of 
Holding small 
of cattlex.s tock
O 1 - 1 0 1 1 - 80 81 + Total
0 \ 1 8 . 1  16,27b\
15.4
1 3 , 79b\^
N v  11.3 
1 0,120v\ ^
0.3
2 3 b \
\  45.0 
40, 4 10'
1 - 10 1 . 2
’1,10 0
\  8.5 
7,610V\^
\ 1 0 . 3
9,260 'v.
0 . 1 
90 \
20 . 2
18,160
11 - 80 1 .71,51th
5.9 
5,260- .
\ ^ 2 2  .1  
19, 810
\ l -8 
1,660'
31.4
28,230
81 + 0 . 1
120\
0.4
370--.
1.4 
1, 3 0 0 \
\  1.4 
1,240 3 ■ 4 3,020\
Total \ ^ 2 1 . 4  19,190
\  30.1 
27,040 \
i
45.1 
40,480 \
3.6 • lOO
3,220 ! 89,8201
Source: Adapted from RIDS - Further Analysis, C.S.O., Gaborone, May 1979.
per cent lack small stock. In addition (row 1) nearly 27 per cent of 
households own no cattle but have between 1 and 80 small stock, whereas 
only 3 per cent of households who have no small stock possess cattle 
(column 1 ).
Historical Background to Livestock Ownership
Three factors may be identified as responsible for generating 
inequalities in livestock ownership. First, entrepreneurs may enter 
the industry 'at the top' as large-scale commercial ranchers or use 
savings/credit obtained elsewhere to initia.te relatively large herds.
The growth of commercial livestock production in Botswana occurred 
particularly on a number of large modern ranches owned by freehold 
farmers. These owned only 3 per cent of the land and 14 per cent of 
the national herd in 1975 but supplied roughly half of the cattle 
slaughtered by the Botswana Meat Commission, though in part this 
reflects their role in finishing cattle from a very much larger number
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of semi - traditional farmers. These farms, located in the Tuli block 
in the northeast, the Mologo Farms near the southern border, and the 
Ghanzi Block in the far west, are owned principally by white farmers 
(some of whom are Botswana citizens)and some wealthy Botswana, including 
civil servants. This aspect of 'entry at the top' is not merely recent, 
since Roe (1980, p.27) points out (referring back to Parsons, 1977,p.120 
and Schapera, 1943, pp. 218-9) that
"Cattle ownership was traditionally tied to representatives 
and close associates of the tribal chieftaincy along with, 
somewhat later, a minority of entrepreneurs, such as school 
teachers and government employees, who invested their wages 
into cattle holdings."
Apart from this element, secondly, it is likely that a pastoral 
society in which land is communal (with no institutional limit to an 
individual's access to grazing) shows a natural tendency to generate
Iinequality of holding. This is because a large herd (especially if the 
owner can divide his herd geographically) has a better chance of 
surviving droughts and other hazards and because larger owners are in 
a better position to replenish their herds by natural process or by 
recourse to the market. Roe states (1980> p.20) that
"There is evidence that the drought of the 1960's increased 
the skewed distribution of livestock holdings among the 
Batswana,that is, those with small herds lost dispro­
portionately more of their livestock than owners of larger 
herds (Campbell, 1979,p.108, Kooijman, 1978, p.78) . It is 
highly probable that this dynamic was at work in the 
devastating drought of the 1930's and explains partly 
the dramatic increase in the number of migrant labourers 
during that time"
and again (p.27)
"Whatever gain in livestock numbers the. small herder 
managed to acquire was probably wiped out for the father 
in the drought of the 1930's and for the son in the 
drought of the 1960's"
In other words periodic drought hits the small herder hardest and
keeps him small, rather than periodically reducing the larger herds in
cyclical fashion to maintain some sort of equilibrium, as often suggested
in the literature on this subject. Livestock accumulation may be seen as
a 'ladder', with small stock owners at the bottom and large cattle -
keepers at the upper end, in which those successful in the 'game' against
natural hazards move up and those unsuccessful down and perhaps off the
ladder altogether. Small stock, which reproduce more rapidly and are
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more resistant to drought/ are particularly important in building up the 
minimum 'stakes' and can be progressively converted to acquire a smaJ1 
cattle herd. However in this game success is likely to breed success, 
and vice versa, for the reasons suggested, and thus generate inequality 
of holding. ^
The third factor is that to an important extent the expansion of 
cattle - raising in Botswana has been associated with investment in 
water supplies, particularly boreholes, which because of its high 
capital requirement, has been the preserve of larger owners. Roe 
states (1980, p.7, see originally Ronald, 1972, p.4) that
" the number of private boreholes and cattle posts 
increased considerably over time, thereby creating 
a situation where relatively larger herds had access 
to fairly permanent water supplies, while the smaller 
herds of poor stockholders were left to communal 
water sources that were traditionally highly 
susceptible to drought stress and attendant 
overgrazing."
The cost of borehole drilling (exclusive of equipping) was estimated 
to be between £950 and £1,325 in 1960 (Morse, I960, p.38), but it has 
always been high, the Pirn Report (1933, p.186) estimating the average 
cost of a borehole i'n 19 32 to be around £300. Hence from the very 
beginning
"... the cost of sinking a well, let alone a borehole, 
was so prohibitive that only the very wealthy could 
afford a well for private use; the provision for 
communal use had to be funded either through tribal 
treasuries or by syndicates of large livestock 
owners" (Roe, 1980, p.14).
and Chief Tshekedi argued before the Pirn Commission that
"it was not possible for a man owning 40 head of
cattle to sink a water-hole (well), the expenses
would be too high for him."
and yet
"... enough wealth existed in the Ngwato area for 
there to have been at least 774 wells and boreholes
there in 1932." (Roe, p.14).
Conflicting estimates exist of the cumulative number of boreholes drilled
up to 1960, as shown in Table 8. However the table suggests a figure
in the range 1,500 to 3,000 for the number of publicly and privately
constructed boreholes up to 1960. After 1960 there was an acceleration
in activity and in the short period 1964-66, for example, about 1,100
Table 8. Estimates of Boreholes Drilled : Bechuanaland Protectorate 
(Figures in parentheses are for successful boreholes.)
Director, Geological Survey. Morse Commission
1
L Government Private Total Government Private Total
1929-59 1152(662) 1146 (823 2298 (1485) 1946-56 414 (220) (395) (615)
1956-60 437 (270) (220) (490)
1929-59 (1485) 1946-60 - (490) (615) (1105)
Campbell
Government & Private Total
Up to 1954 (1350)
1955-60 (1700)
Up to 1960 (3050)
Source: Roe, 1980
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private boreholes were sunk, many of these in the sandveld areas 
(Campbell, 1979,pp.99-104) . Roe states (p.16) that
"By 1965, a transformation had occurred in the role of 
water provision vis-a-vis livestock production in the 
Protectorate: livestock water development was largely 
being focussed in sandveld areas by private livestock 
holders, where their ability to open up these areas 
drew heavily from the government experience of over 
a quarter of a century of borehole drilling in the 
Kalahari as a means of opening up the desert to 
stock routes and ranches."
Taking the period up to Independence,
"The general trend through the colonial period appears 
to have been one of an increasingly unequal distri­
bution of holdings." (p.7)...
"... by becoming part and parcel of the development 
of the Protectorate's livestock sector, borehole 
drilling and ownership became both a consequence 
and cause of an_increasingly skewed distribution 
of-livestock holdings. Drilling was feasible only 
if the livestock sector was viable and conversely, 
the growth of livestock numbers in the country was 
primarily a function of the increasing number of 
boreholes there." (p.17).
The process described above continued and perhaps even gained 
momentum after Independence, apart from a temporary freeze which had 
to be instituted in February, 1974 to permit closer assessment of the 
effects on the water table and of the implications for land use planning. 
By that time, as already mentioned, nearly 7,000 boreholes were in 
existence.
There is some uncertainty as to what ownership of a borehole implies 
regarding access to land where the range is communal. It is not easy 
for individuals or syndicates operating boreholes to prevent general 
access to the water source and the presence of traditional water sources 
in the vicinity open to all would bring competition for grazing. However, 
recent figures gave sources of water as 61 per cent boreholes, 11 per 
cent small dams, and only 28 per cent traditional sources (pans, wells 
etc.) . And ownership of a borehole appears to produce de facto owner­
ship of the surrounding range. Thus a 1975 World Bank document states 
that
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"The Government's present practice of awarding water 
rights and approving the establishment of boreholes 
on a "first-come, first-served" basis contributes to 
the skewed distribution of resources and incomes in 
the ranching sector, since allocation of water confers 
a de facto right over the surrounding grazing lands.
A more equitable situation could be achieved if,
for instance, priority of water rights and government 
assistance were given to small cattle farmers 
combined in group ranches or syndicates".
Apart from traditional sources, smaller livestock - keepers may have
access to District Council boreholes and have the option of forming
syndicates. The latter were an important medium for tribal borehole
drilling as long ago as the 1930's among the Bakgatla (Kooijman, 1978,
pp. 73-4). However the syndicates themselves are likely to be of
medium-to-large owners and District Council boreholes may be leased
to such- syndicates, on a subsidized basis, rather than open to the
'general public', because of high maintenance costs.
■4
This section cannot be concluded without a reference to the Tribal 
Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) which was launched by the Government's Paper 
No.2 of 1975. This was an ambitious and well-intended attempt to 
reallocate grazing land and increase livestock production at the same 
time as improving range management practices. Under the policy the 
range was divided into three categories, communal land, commercial land 
and reserved land. Larger livestock owners are encouraged to leave 
the communal areas, increasing commercial production and at the same 
time easing overgrazing and leaving more space for smaller owners in 
the communal areas. Thus smaller as well as larger livestock - keepers 
would benefit.
It is doubtful whether the actual effects have been those anticipated. 
The main financial assistance granted, including subsidized water 
consumption, has been to those who moved to the commercial land, i.e. 
the larger owners. To some extent, also, TGLP has operated as an 
'enclosure movement' in which sections of the communal range may be 
fenced off and transferred to large livestock - owners. More generally, 
it is not certain exactly how the land allocation process under TGLP is 
working out. It has become clear that the public is very far from
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being fully aware of its rights and that there is as yet no general
programme of land adjudication and regulation (Ministry of Agriculture,
1978) . Moreover 1ivestock-keepers transferring to the commercial areas
were simultaneously maintaining a herd in the communal areas, in many
cases, or even sending part of the increase in their cattle wealth
deriving from access to commercial grazing land back to the communal
land, thus denying the remaining smaller livestock-owners of much
of the anticipated benefit arising out of transfers. Also, the TGLP
does nothing to help those who do not possess cattle to obtain these
and more generally has been critised as representing a purely 'livestock'
approach, not covering the full variety of economic activities which are
7carried on in the areas concerned. Indeed, the approach has been 
narrower than this, since it largely excludes sheep and goats, which 
are relatively more important for smaller livestock-keepers. There 
may also have been a negative impact on the mafisa system. Finally, 
referring back to the 'livestock ladder' discussed earlier TGLP may 
operate to reduce the risks particularly of the larger owners and those 
who have been most successful in the game against nature, reinforcing 
and making more permanent the divisions identified.
Basic Factors Limiting the Spread of Incomes and Employment
As suggested above, the rapid real rates of growth experienced in 
Botswana over the last two decades or more could nevertheless be described 
as 'growth without development': this despite genuine and continuing efforts 
on the part of government to secure wider participation in the benefits
of growth. The reason lies in certain basic factors which limit the spread
of income and employment opportunities in Botswana. Briefly these are:
1. Neither of the two main economic activities, mining and cattle-raising, 
are labour-intensive. Mining is capital-intensive and livestock-keeping 
land-intensive, involving economies of scale in herding which reduce labour 
requirements. Thus neither of the two activities create very much 
employment. In fact livestock-keeping in some areas already has been
competitive for land with arable farming, reducing the scope for the
alternatives, much more labour-intensive agricultural occupation: to that 
extent it may actually become employment-destroying. As we shall see, 
this aspect is likely to become increasingly important.
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2. Neither of the two leading activities have so far had important
8linkages or multiplier effects, although they both earn foreign exchange 
and mining, in p irticular, generates government revenue which can be used 
for development. Moreoever, in addition to the effect on arable agriculture 
just mentioned, the expansion of the livestock sector has made serious 
inroads into the traditional hunting and gathering economy, another back­
wash effect. The low multiplier effect is due to the inequality of 
wea.lth and income in the livestock sector together with a high marginal 
propensity to consume imported goods.
3. This is related to the natural tendency hypothesised above for a 
traditional pastoral livestock system to generate inequality of holdings. 
This tendency has been aggravated in Botswana by the dependence of the 
expansion of livestock activity upon expensive capital inputs for water 
supply,'favouring larger stock holders and commercial ranchers, and 
perhaps inadvertently by the official Tribal Grazing Land Policy.4
4. Development of secondary and tertiary sectors, particularly the 
'informal sector' so important in its effect on the real economic welfare 
of citizens in most African countries, has been noticeably limited in 
Botswana (see Livingstone, 1980), for a number of reasons.
The most important of these is competition from cheap South African 
goods which, together with the small size of the domestic market (small 
population X low income per head), has restricted manufacturing possibi­
lities historically 3 and in 1976-77 to 5 per cent of GDP. Apart from a 
marked dearth of rural (and urban) artisans, lack of local entrepreneur­
ship and the absence of an immigrant trading class like the East African 
Asians has meant a less effective and more expensive trading network for 
produce-buying and the distribution of retail goods. A few expatriate- 
owned stores stocking a wide range of goods tend to dominate retail 
distribution in the small townships.
The Marketing Board (BAMB) has relatively few buying points for 
produce outside the main townships, and the cooperative movements lack 
any extensive or effective organisation, particularly in the less 
accessible parts of the country.
These factors worsen the rural-urban terms of trade, reduce real 
incomes, and make life harder for the mass of the population in the 
rural areas. At the same time, although a process of rural-urban
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migration is under way, there is little or no industry in Botswana to 
provide a core or productive foundation for urban centres: hence the 
prospects for urban employment, even for informal sector employment 
(since this depends in part on a core of formal sector industries), are 
very poor, compared to other African countries.
5. Hence the majority of the population are left to obtain a live­
lihood in the circumscribed areas which have some potential for cult- 
ivativation, engaged in low-productivity arable farming, mainly for 
subsistence.
While peasant farmers elsewhere in Africa have been able to obtain 
money income through the successful production of cash crops for export, 
the main cash 'crop' in Botswana has been cattle and their products, 
where larger stockholders have dominated.
Even if small-scale producers of maize and sorghum, the main food 
crops in Botswana, are able- to obtain a marketable surplus, prices are 
again kept down by competition from cheap imported grain from South 
Africa (Table 9) with which only the freehold and other farmers operating 
on a larger scale are comfortable.
A consequence of the structure described above is that the economy 
is an extremely open one, with imports equal to 67 per cent of GDP in 
1975 and exports 45 per cent. The latter figure will increase con­
siderably over the next few years. While minerals and commercial live­
stock production are oriented to the export market, manufactured goods 
have largely to be imported, mainly, because of transport advantage, 
from South Africa. Beyond this, the very low productivity of most 
arable agriculture means that a substantial food deficit (excluding 
meat) exists which requires very large imports and use of foreign 
exchange.
The export - import position is one important element (investment is 
another) in the dependency situation, particularly vis-a-vis South 
Africa, in which Botswana finds itself, directly affecting opportunities 
for income and employment creation.
Table 9 . Imports and Exports of Selected Agricultural Commodities 1974-77
1974
Imports 
(c.i.f. and duty inclusive) 
1975 1976 1977 1974 1975 1976 1977
(units of account)
Total Cereals (grain) 540,604 640,686 1,113,221 2,396,047 133,166 904,229 340,534 129,548
Maize — — 662,102 1,147,806 — — 253,404 67,761
Wheat — 3,167 4,882 — — 16,500 53,132
Sorghum — 123,097 694,598 — — 52,431 7,679
Milled Cereals 3,971,791 5,047,688 6,759,042 10,212,876 15,901 10,792 23,139 129,196
Wheat flour — 2,320,100 3,479,543 — — 7,167 0
Maize: flour & stamped — 3,841,846 6,189,282 — — 684 10,059
Dairy Produce 2,263,554 3,195,131 3,108 7,367
Vegetables 522,989 906,577 1,071,095 1,353,451 604,914 702,570 602,136 248,206
Fruit and nuts 311,885 425,288 579,548 745,932 9,069 66,643 15,291 1,664
Sugar and confections 3,034,901 3,666,884 4,671,345 6,064,4 32 1,094 .138 1,073 11,069
Poultry and eggs — 497,251 657,075 — — 0 50
Source: External Trade Statistics, 1977, Gaborone
(Prior to the end of April 1977, the unit of account was equal to PI.00; subsequently it has been equal to P.096).
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Employment Prospects
Employment prospects need, moreover, to be seen against increasing 
population size. At the present rate of growth of 3 per cent, population 
in Botswana could double in 22 years. If this occurred the economy in 
1991 would need to support 557,000 more people than in 1971, an increase 
of 89 per cent. This is shown in Table 10. Tables 11 and 12 give 
estimates of possible increases in employment in the formal sector
Table 10. Twenty-year Population Projection fcr Botswana.
1971 1991 Increase 1971 - 1991 
(per cent)
Total population (’000) 623 1180 89
bhare of urban population
(per cent ) 10 26
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
and in agriculture and the rural and urban informal sectors over the 
period 1979 to 1984. The estimates are based on two alternative 
assumptions of policy. In the more conservative assumption, the con­
tinuation of current policies is implied with only modest changes in the 
structure of sectoral activities. These changes accordingly involve 
small changes in employment as indicated below. However, the more 
optimistic assumptions would require greater decentralisation, dynamisation 
of the rural population, allocation of funds outside the government- 
controlled system to rural industry, trade and housing, and the break-up 
of free-hold farms. These suggest nil increases in employment on 
freehold farms, in livestock farming (with overgrazinq already in many 
areas) and in hunting and gathering (which sector might even be expected 
to shrink in size), and an increase of only 2,000 in manufacturing out 
of total increases of some 76,000. The government sector, having grown 
in size very rapidly already in the period 1974-79, would again make
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Table 11. Estimates of Formal Sector Employment, 1974-84
1974
No.
1979
No. (a)
1984
* (b) f1A'
1ncrease 
1979-84 
(a) (b)
Proportion 
of in r n  e
1979-84 
(ft) (1-3
rriehold farms 4, ISO - 4, TOO 4, J00 6,800 0 2,500 0 ' . :
pining and 
quarrying 4,1 >0 _ 8 ,1 0 0 7,900 8,600 7,800 ',400 9.7 8/
"••mufncturinp 3, vio - 6,500 8,500 9 ,6 0 0 2,000 3,100 (>.'} 7.“
lec tri city 
•in 1 w-. ter 5?5 _ 1 ,2 0 0 1,700 2,00 0 500 800 1.7 ?.'
one true tion 8 ,0 7 3 - 9,800 13,700 15,000 3,900 5,700 13.6 1V>
Trade 9, 400 - 12,400 18,000 20,'>00 8,600 7 , 6 0 0 19.4 19.0
ransnort ind 
communications 1 , 0 5 0 _ 2,500 3,300 3,300 800 1 , 1 0 0 7.8 2.H
(ither services 3 , 4 2 5 - 5,700 8,000 9 ,000 7,300 3,300 8 ,'• f‘. •
Total, excluding 
government 75,975 70 47,500 65,400 61 92,400 68 1 7 , 9 0 0 27,0 0 0 6? 6 7 . 5
iovernm'jnt 15,675 30 3 1,0 0 0 42, -00 39 44,000 37,
OO
1 3 ,0 0 0 38 3: . 5
Total 8 1 .6 0 0 100 78,500 107,400 100 136,400 100 28 ,90 0 O O O 100 ion
Not£: Estimates for 1974 are from Statistical Bulletin, C.S.O. June 1979
Estimates for 1979 and 1984 have been made on the basis of alternative 
assumptions (see text).
Table 12. Estimates of Employment in Agriculture and Informal Sector 
1979 - 1984.
Sector 1979 1984 Increase 1979 - 1984
Informal urban 14,000 24,000 10,000
Informal rural 19,000 25,000 6,000
Livestock farming 60,000 60,000 0
Arable farming 35,000 60,000 25,000
Hunting/gathering 5, 500 5,500 0
Domestic service 12,200 18,400 6,200
Total 145,700 193,000 47,200
Ncvte: These estimates are based on the conservative assumptions (see text).
The division between formal and informal sector activities in Botswana 
is difficult because of continuous interchange between them.
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a substantial contribution, 11,000, to the increase. But the major 
increases would be in the informal sector, 16,000, and in the 
'residual employer', arable farming, 25,000.
These estimates are extremely shaky, particularly the division 
between livestock farming and arable farming in Table 12, which 
division is bound to be arbitrary because of the interdependence of 
livestock - keeping and arable farming. Tne figures do make the 
important points that the main income earners, mining and cattle- 
raising, will provide very little additional employment; that little 
assistance can be expected from manufacturing; that a very large 
number of people will have to be absorbed into the informal sector, 
rural and urban, into trade, and into domestic service where income 
opportunities are uncertain; and that the main hope for the employment 
of the large additional workforce which will be 'coming on to the 
market' lies with the sector in which a very large segment of the 
population is already engaged, arable agriculture. The need to 
develop arable agriculture as the main source of new employment is 
already well recognised by the Botswana government. The difficulty 
is to provide adequate and reliable income opportunity in this sector 
in which productivity is at present extremely low. We need now tot
examine what the possibilities might be both for improving product 
ivity in agriculture and absorbing an increasing number of farm
households.
Origins of Poverty and Inequality in Arable Farming
The two most important factors affecting farm productivity for the 
large majority of Botswana farmers are (1) access to draught power, and 
(2) the physical separation between villages, lands and cattle posts, 
which affects the management of arable farming.
The most important if not generally recognised feature of arable 
farming in Botswana is that it is basically extensive in nature, rather 
than intensive, due to the low average productivity of the land, 
vulnerability to drought, and unresponsiveness to fertilizer application. 
Without mechanisation of any sort and using only the hoe, labour avail­
ability imposes a severe constraint on the number of hectares planted
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and thus total farm output and household food supply. Ox ploughing 
with one team can comfortably increase this to 6 hectares or more 
and the availability of draught oxen becomes crucial. Here inequality 
in livestock ownership links across to inequality of opportunity in 
arable farming: since the RIDS reported that in 1974 about 45 per cent 
of rural households owned no cattle at all, it is likely that a 
much .1 ;rger proportion did not have available their own ox teams.
Table 7 suggests 65 per cent had 10 animals or less, whereas perhaps 
25 would be needed to maintain an ox team of six. Oland and Alverson 
( 1978 ) estimated that between 30 and 40 per cent of farmers lacked 
demand rights of any kind to cattle for draught power. The situation 
is eased somewhat by the possibility of borrowing or hiring oxen: thus 
90 per cent of farmers covered by the last agricultural survey ploughed 
with oxen although only 38 per cent ploughed exclusively with their own 
team. The Study of Constraints ( Ministry of Agriculture, 1974, p.25).
.4
revealed access to draught power to be one of three main factors (the 
others were lack of rain and lack of seed) affecting farmers' decisions 
not to plant larger areas. These areas are generally small: according 
to the Agricultural Survey of 1971-72 60 per cent of farming families
planted less than 4 hectares, where average grain crops yields are as 
low as 200 to 300 kg per hectare, falling to very much lower levels in 
bad years.
This is shown in Table 13, which also reveals the considerable 
degree of rural stratification related in part at least to this factor. 
Thus the top 10 per cent of farm holders planted 34 per cent of the 
land area and the bottom 34 per cent just over 8 per cent of the land 
area, the latter each planting less than 2 hectares.
Even those with their own cattle are at the mercy of the elements: 
the usual practice is to start cultivating with the first rain, covering 
as large a patch as possible before the land dries out again, expanding 
the area progressively with further instalments of rain. Obviously 
those who, worse still, have to wait upon others for their opportunity 
to plough, obtaining only second or third chances of utilizing the rains, 
will achieve very much smaller hectarages and, due to poorer timing, 
lower yields. This will be worse, in bad years when 'at the end of the 
queue'there may be no more rains to utilize.
Table 13. Distribution of Agricultural Holders by Hectare Planted 
1971-72.
- 2 2  -
Hectares Holders Hectares Percentages
planted (OOO) (OOO) Holders Hectares
0 3.5 0 5.5 0 )
-2
2-4
17 .9 
17.6
2 1 . 1
49.3
28.2 
27 .6 79.5
8.2 ) 
19.1 )
48.7
4-6 1 1 . 6 55.2 18.2 21.4 )
6-3 6.5 43 .8 1 0 .1 17.0 )
8-10 3.6 32.1 5.7 1 2. 0 )
10-20 2.5 37.9 3.9 20.5 14.7 ) 50.9
20-40 0.3 6.3 0.5 2.5
40+ 0 .2 12.3 0.3 4.7 )
Total 64 .7 258.1 100.0 100.0
Source: Agricultural Survey 1971-72, p.30.
In response to this severe land preparation constraint an interesting 
system of what is rather inaccurately described as "sharecropping" has 
developed. This may involve either tractors or ox-plough teams with or 
without planters and cultivators as supplementary equipment and is a 
means of spreading overhead costs. The practice is fairly significant 
in certain parts of the Hardveld.
It is not, in fact, sharecropping in the traditional sense, under 
which a small tenant cultivates the land of the large owner and makes 
a proportionate payment in kind to him: rather the reverse. Here it is 
the tractor owner, say, who seeks additional land and rents a major 
piece of land allocated to a small owner, carrying out more advanced 
fanu operations on this portion. The tractor owner may obtain as much 
as three-quarters of the product from this portion, paying the other 
quarter in kind to the small farmer.
The origin of the transaction may lie in an initial excess allocation 
of land to the smaller owner (i.e. it may be a means of getting around 
the restrictiveness of the Land Board allocations) or in the lack of 
means available to the small farmer to plant and cultivate his or 
her land. 1Sharecropping1 is thus very much a second best solution.
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In the former case the tractor owner is using land which may not be
used at the moment but may be needed for more equitable distribution
some time in the future. In the second case this alternative to
providing the owner with the necessary means of utilizing his own
land may mean his impoverishment.^
The unusual division in Botswana between major/minor villages, 
"lands" and cattle posts referred to earlier, with circular migration
be'tween the three, may have both general and specific effects on
agricultural productivity. The general one is associated with loss 
of interest (including incentive to invest) and managerial effective­
ness as a result of living away from the lands areas for substantia] 
parts of the year. The specific effects are inability to take 
immediate advantage of the first rain (small farmers with oxen may 
be as much as two days walk from the lands, while those with tractors 
can drive over immediately); and, most important, inability to adopt 
winter or autumn ploughing rather than simple spring ploughing. Land 
ploughed ahead of the 'spring' rains are able to absorb the rain as it 
arrives, reducing run-off (and erosion) and thus making maximum use 
of the rains. This benefits both area and yield, for in bad years the
vast majority of farmers who are only able to 'spring plough' may obtain
no output at all. The most incisive aspect of poverty in Botswana may 
in fact not be the low level of subsistence income so much as its 
unreliability and low level or even absence in bad years. Unfortunate]y 
most farmers cannot be resident at the lands through the year and at
these other critical times/ because of the lack of water for either
11domestic use or for watering stock. This factor is a major source of 
inequality as well as of poverty.
As stated above, average grain yields in Botswana are of the order 
of 200 to 300 kg, with lower yields in bad years. Farming households 
are frequently in a position where they need to supplement their own 
subsistence production with food obtained in other ways. Table 14 
shows that the sale of livestock is the most important means of doing 
this, but families may depend on food or money obtained from relatives, 
or remittances from migrant members of the household; or may work for 
food (a government scheme) or for other farmers engaged in either 
arable or livestock activities. One significant point about this table
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Table 14. Means uf Obtaining Food in Case of Shortfall in Household 
Production.
Supplementary Frequency of sufficient production
1
|
Food Source Every year Most years Infrequently Never Total j
Sell stock 45.4 54 .4 26.7 18.2 25.2
Live with relatives 4.6 4.8 11.5 13.9 12. 0 i
Ask food from
others 4.2 6.9 11.5 13.4 1 1 . 8
Money sent by 
family member 17.6 8.4 1 1 . 6 9.7 10.9
Borrow money 
from relatives 13.4 5.5 9.1 7.1 8.3
Food-for-work 4.6 9.8 1 1 . 0 13.1 11.5
Work on land or
crops of others - 5.1 5.0 8. 1 6.0
Work with others'
1 ivestock - - 1.4 1.7 1.4
Work in mines 4.6 0.5 5.6 6.6 5.7
Other (misc.) 5.5 4.8 6.7 8.0 7.1
%Total No . of
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
responses 2,1 60 4,190 65,050 37 ,370 108,770
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1974, P.52.
is that it is the households who have 'sufficient' production of their
own every year or most years who make the greatest use of livestock sales
to pay for supplementary food purchases. The poorest households in 
terms of grain production are not able to do this to the same extent, 
and are forced to look for work much more.
Female - Headed Households
The movement of men into the South African mines and into the
urban areas of Botswana has had profound social and economic effects
on Botswana. Since about 40 per cent of rural households are temporarily
or perm,!nently without adult men, women are the effective head of house-
12hold for a very large proportion of rural families: so much so that
the term 'female - headed household' is practically an every-day term 
among social scientists and statisticians in Botswana. Their numbers
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may indeed be too large to be explained only in terms of migration to 
the m i n e s .  A rel at ed statistic is that in the working age groups women 
outnumber men by a ratio of 14 to 10.
As observed above, poverty in arable agriculture stems particularly 
from lack of access to draught power. A large majority of female - 
headed households fall into this category, since three-quarters of them 
own no cattle, as compared to only one-third of male - headed households. 
In other words the statistic quoted earlier of 45 per cent rural 
households without cattle at all is heavily weighted by the large 
proportion of female - headed households in that position. The same 
source (RIDS) shows that those that did have cattle apparently had only 
half as many as male - headed families.
This lack of livestock is partly the consequence of the tradition­
ally distinct agricultural roles played by men and women (cattle -
4 *keeping being a male role), which tradition imposes other social and 
economic handicaps on these households. The effect is that the house­
holds are deprived of both draught power and male labour for clearing 
and ploughing. Women thus have to rely on male relatives to do their 
ploughing, leading to late ploughing, low acreages and low productivity, 
and failure to plough at all. Apparently about 40 per cent of female - 
headed families fail to plough in any one year compared to 20 per cent 
(still high!) for male - headed households.RIDS also showed that female 
- headed households on average ploughed only two-thirds of the area 
ploughed by households which had male heads but no male present during 
the ploughing season.
Another factor affecting the incomes of. female - headed households 
is lack of the same access to employment either in the rural areas or in 
the urban sector. Although not a homogeneous group, the households 
headed by women received incomes which were on average less than half 
those received by male - headed households.
It might have been expected that female - headed households with 
husbands away in the mines or formal sector employment would have been 
comparatively well off, due to the receipt of remittances and to the 
possibility of investing accumulated savings in livestock in order to 
begin to climb up the scale of livestock, and wealth, ownership.
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Certainly a good number of former mine employees have made this sort of 
transition. But this assumes much more stable household ties than 
probably exists; may exaggerate the size of average annual remittances 
per household; underestimate the very long period of time spent away, 
affecting the interest in farm investment; and exaggerate the ext onL of 
wise use of accumulated funds by returning workers.
Female-headed households are widely accepted as a target group of 
rural poor. Devising effective means of assistance is obviously a 
problem, however. The crucial thing would appear to be to find some 
means of providing draught power, either by credit for the acquisition 
of livestock or by providing cheap government ploughing services.
Without draught power to overcome the basic labour constraint the 
provision of other inputs would not be worth considering. The use 
of donkey draught has been mentioned, donkeys being easier to control 
and manage.
Remote Area Dwellers in Botswana
The major disadvantaged group in Botswana consists of the so-called 
Remote Area Dwellers (RADS). These include the Basarwa or 'Bushmen' who 
have traditionally been hunters and gatherers but also a mixed group of 
BakgalagaJi, Bamangwato, Bakalanga and Bahero, occupying areas of low 
population density. Together they could account for some 50,000 out 
of a population of 800,000. Together with the Basarwa the latter have 
been regarded in the past as inferior and historically formed a 'malata' 
or servile class with restricted entitlement to cattle and have often 
been used as domestic servants, as herdsmen, particularly, and also as 
supplementary labour for cultivation. The Bakgalagadi tribal group 
remains under the supervision of Tswana chiefs.
Until a few centuries ago the Basarwa lived all over Southern Africa, 
especially in what is now the Republic of South. Africa, but they 
retreated progressively in the face of the incoming agriculturalist 
with stronger and more aggressive social systems and of competition for 
communal land, traditionally used by the hunter/gatherers, from li v<'.<; t oek - 
keepers. About half of the surviving estimated 55,000 Bushmen of 
Southern Africa now live within Botswana, the remainder being nearby in 
Eastern Namibia and Southern Angola.
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There is a tendency in Botswana to see the 'Basarwa problem' as a 
social and cultural one and therefore relatively intractable. Certainly- 
according to a social anthropologist recently working in the area, the 
Bushmen, as a result of their past isolation from other groups and 
independent languages, have never developed a strong self-image of 
themselves or strong Cu 1 Iural identities, so that they have generally 
failed to defend themselves, their environment, their culture or way 
of life with any aggressiveness. (Wily, 1977). However, the
origin of the 'Basarwa problem' clearly lies in the steady erosion of the 
hunting/gathering economy, which must clearly have been greatly accelerated 
in the last two decades with the extension of grazing areas westward.
And the common suggestion that Basarwa are not 'economic men' and are 
incapable of effective management of resources is not entirely consistent 
with the evidence: a significant number have made good progress after 
settling in Ngamiland, where they are cultivating and keeping livestock; 
substantial numbers living as 'squatter farmers' in the Ghanzi freehold 
block do own significant numbers of large and small stock, but are 
hampered by lack of land for expansion; a third group work in different 
places, particularly at cattle posts, as wage labourers, and as long - 
distance cattle - drovers, indicating a desire as well as need to 
participate in the money economy. And if we include the RADS in the 
very substantial portion of rural households in Botswana who lack the 
draught power required for effective arable farming, it may be noted 
that many Basarwa and similar groups have experience of donkey draught.
It should be noted, moreover, that hunting and gathering are not simply 
a 'way of life', impervious to economic considerations: resort to this 
mode cipju'drs to increase when the limited amount of arable crops fail, 
worsening the permanent shortage of food.
Efforts to assist have been made by the Ministry of Lands and Local 
Government through a number of projects, but these have been rather 
piecemeal. Current efforts at assistance are through the vehicle of the 
Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), which began as the much more 
limited 'Bushmen Development Project’ before being incorporated into the 
National Development Plan early in 1975. Apart from some specific 
settlement schemes, the object of the programme is to take fuller account 
of these groups in land use planning exercises, as has been done in
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Kgalagadi and Ghanzi. In some cases a 'communal service centre strategy' 
has been adopted whereby reserved areas are set aside for the use of 
defined groups of RADS and provided with basic services. In designated 
'Wildlife Management Areas' (WMA's), RADS may be permitted to co-exist 
with the wildlife.
However from what has just been said above it is necessary to recognise 
(1) that several categories should be distinguished as regards present 
capacity to manage resources is concerned, some being more ready to 
participate in settled arable farming or to manage livestock than others, 
and (2) that for a large proportion the most fundamental problem is that 
of access to resources. Protection of Basarwa, along with wildlife in 
the WMA's, supported by Communal Service Centres, though highly desirable,I
clearly only goes a little way in this direction.
Weaknesses in the management of resources should not be considered 
a valid argument against a development effort in favour of economically 
weak groups. Since these constitute a significant proportion, some 60,000 
out of 750-800,000, of the total population, rejection of one solution 
should depend upon a superior one being available: for a lack of positive
proposals implies an increasing number of destitute rural families as the 
hunting/gathering economy continues to crumble and life in this economy 
appears decreasingly attractive alongside emerging wealth. The necessity 
is therefore to see this not as a 'Basarwa problem' but as a problem of 
creating employment and income opportunities, that is, as part of the 
general problem being considered here. Given the relative immobility 
of Basarwa a radical solution must depend on allocation of (good) land 
in the Western Sandveld i.e. in the Ghanzi Strip. Assistance towards 
settled arable farming could continue but since livestock - keeping has 
closer affinity with the traditional way of life some form of goat 
distribution scheme which would introduce more of the Basarwa to at least 
the bottom rung c: the 'livestock ladder' recommends itself. Achievement 
of family holdings of some 20 or 30 goats would represent a very important 
raising of the standard of life for such households. And they could 
represent a transition in the most successful instances to cattle owner- s 
ship within a mixed farming system. Small stock are, indeed, a traditional, 
component of mixed farming in Botswana.
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Urban Unemployment and Poverty
Out of a population in Botswana of some 800,000 people the capita] 
Gaborone has close to 50,000 and the three other main towns (Lobatse, 
Francistown and Selebi-Phikwe) 20-30,000. Beyond these a distinction is 
made locally between 'large' (major traditional') and 'small' villages, 
although some of the former approximate to small townships of 10-20,f>00 
people. The reason for this unusual nomenclature is perhaps related to 
the division mentioned earlier between villages, lands and cattle posts: 
with people not fully resident in the lands area for cultivation purposes, 
even small townships can serve as bases for farming/livestock keeping 
communities and being more rural than would normally be the case merit 
the title of 'major villages'.
Keeping this in mind, we can examine anticipated population growth 
rates and their implications in Table 15. A high,national population 
growth rate of 3.6 per cent per annum over the period 1971 - 79 has 
increased population towards the 800,000 mark; but rural - urban migration 
at over 10 per cent per annum over this period meant that while national 
population increased by one third, the population of urban centres and 
of urban centres together with large villages more than doubled. 
Consequently the combined share of the latter in the total population 
increased from 30 per cent in 1971 to 40 per cent in 1979, and is 
projected to increase to 57 per cent in 1984 and perhaps 63 per cent 
in 1989, when nearly two-thirds of the entire population of the country 
could be in the urban sector.
Formal sector employment in the towns has not been growing at 
anything like the rate necessary to absorb this influx, however, and 
since the migrants come largely from the low productivity arable 
sector the effect of rural - urban migration in Botswana inevitably 
means simply conversion of rural poverty into urban poverty: in 
the absence of formal sector employment and of a strong informal 
sector, this may also imply open unemployment. As already mentioned, 
the absence of a 'core' of manufacturing industry in Botswana towns 
must affect their absorptive capacity. According to a social and
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Table 15. Rural and Urban Population Estimates 1971 - 1989 (Thousands)
1971
(annual rate 
of change ) 1979 • 1984 1989
1 . Population of Existing 
Urban Centres 68 (9.6) 142 2 39 280-290
2 . Population of Existing 
Large Villages 80 (10.4) 177 296 350-370
3 . New Towns - (-) - 7 25-30
4 . Total Population of Urban 
Centres and Large 
Villages (1+2+3) 148 (1 0 .1 ) 320 542 655-690
5. Population of Small 
Villages etc. 447 (0 .6) 470 403 408-443
6 . Total National 
Population (de facto) 595 (3.6) 790 945 1098
7. 4 as % of 6 30 40 57 60-63
Notes:
i. Urban centres include: Gaborone, Lobatse, Francistown, Selebi- 
Phikwe, Orapa; Tlokweng and Mogoditshane are included as they 
are being absorbed in the Gaborone urban complex.
ii. Large Villages are semi-urban and include: Serowe, Palapye,
Mahalapye, Mochudi, Molepolole, Kanye, Ramotswa, and Maun. The pressure 
for their recognition as urban centres is likely to increase.
iii. Among new towns Jwaneng is shown for 1984. However, some
new towns may come up if known mineral deposits are exploited.
iv. The effects of (a) absorption of peri-urban areas into existing 
towns, and (b) returning migrants from South Africa to settle 
in urban centres, may be larger than assumed in the growth 
rates for 1979 to 1984.
v. The changes depicted would be further modified if the Government 
adopts a "growth pole" strategy.
economic survey of three peri - urban areas (Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, 1974) unemployment rates for the peri - urban 
areas of Gaborone, Francistown and Selebi - Phikwe ranged from 15 - 18 
per cent for males and .35 - 48 per cent for females. Large numbers of 
urban poor live in squatter housing in or near Gaborone (27 per cent
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of the town's population), Lobatse (23 per cent), Francistown (60 
per cent) and Selebi - Phikwe (40 per cent). All this amounts to 
a rising tide of unemployment and potential poverty which planners 
in Botswana will do well to keep down to a manageable level, irrespective 
of the financial resources with which they may be able to work.
The peculiar pattern of settlement and agricultural organisation 
has some implications, to which it is worth drawing attention. On 
the- one hand the conventional pattern of rural - to - urban migration 
is disturbed: the fact that people are already in or around small 
townships/large villages may mean that there occurs a greatly accelerated 
process of migration and expansion of townships compared with other countries 
On the other hand, a pattern has been established whereby it is possible 
to live in a 'township' while carrying on agriculture in the lands 
and grazing livestock in a third direction, at the cattle post. This implies 
a possibly useful blurring of the lines between urban and rural 
occupations, useful because it may permit the high proportion of the 
population who are in urban centres to obtain some means of subsistence.
Related to this is the fact that the distribution of population 
in Botswana is highly concentrated. Rainfall is such that only about 
6 per cent of the total land area of the country (3 million hectares) 
is cultivable with dryland crops. This is located in what is known 
as the Eastern Kardveld, the Limpopo catchment areas along the 
eastern margin, just before the upper tributaries of the Limpopo 
disappear into South Africa. Examination of a population map shows 
that only a tiny fraction of Botswana's population lives outside 
this narrow strip. What is not so commonly appreciated is that in 
fact the population is concentrated even within this narrow strip 
into just three areas, (one centred on Gaborone, one between Serowe 
and Mahalapye, and the third in the North-east District)*. This will 
further facilitate increasing concentration of the population in 
urban centres.
* See map attached as annex.
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Charting Wealth and Inequality in Botswana
In order to pull together and summarise the various elements in 
our discussion so far, Figure 2 is presented. On the left hand side 
are represented the main sources of wealth and income: from paid
employment, mining and civil service/parastatal jobs, and from self- 
employment accumulation of cattle, commercial ranching and large- 
scale farming, and business enterprise. Civil servants and parastatal 
employees can use savings out of salaries to purchase cattle or to 
invest in business, which may also be entered through savings obtained 
in ranching/farming. The central element is livestock, in which there 
is a ladder starting with poor arable households who may succeed in 
building up, particularly through small stock, a small cattle herd 
which, if they are lucky in the 'game against nature,' they can expand, 
conceivably if not very likely, becoming wealthy: indeed it would be 
easier to enter the box of 'wealthy livestock owners' from the 'civil 
service and parastatal employment' box than to negotiate this risky 
ladder. The reverse process is that owners of small herds or small 
stock who 'lose' against nature may end up as 'poor farming households' 
witli not much chance of escape or, if they lose male heads to mining 
employment (or simply lose their male heads), become even poorer 
female - headed households. Looking at the 'successful arable farmers' 
box this is easier to reach from the 'medium cattle owners' box, 
because of the importance of draught power, the absence of which 
operates among the other obstacles indicated to hinder the progress 
of poor farming households. Finally, it is indicated that the 
activities of the small, medium and large livestock owners have been 
responsible in the past for the progressive erosion of the hunting - 
gathering economy, producing poor RADS and cattle post labour, and 
in the future for land pressure (to be discussed presently) affecting 
poor farming households.
What emerges is the intrinsic difficulty, even if the most 
enlightened policies were devised, of widening access, particularly 
through employment opportunities, to the fruits on the left-hand 
side, and improving welfare among the mass of the population on the 
right hand side, even given generous revenue from the mining of 
diamonds. The prospects for broadening opportunities through the 
development of arable agriculture are considered next.
Fig.2. A Chart of Wealth and Inequality in Botswana
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ALDEP: A Programme for the Development of Arable Agriculture.
The government's recognition of the need to emphasize the arable 
sector underlies the present Arable Lands Development Policy (ALDEP) 
which was announced in early 1978, to complement TGLP . Although the 
numerical concentration of arable farmers is in the Eastern Hardveld,
ALDEP is not confined geographically and incorporates agricultural 
development in any part of Botswana, including more remote areas such 
as the north (where proposals exist for an Integrated Rural Development 
Programme in West Ngamiland and for the development of melapo farming 
around the Okavango Delta) and west (including especially policies and 
projects relating to RADS). In its range, also, ALDEP is viewed as a 
comprehensive but open-ended programme for the development of arable 
farming, focussing on the variety of constraints affecting the farmer's 
production, in which programmes and policies will be tested and evolved 
over a period of time. We comment here only on one or two salient aspects.
One of the foci at the present time is the upgrading of the basic 
technology of arable farmers through a particular technological package. 
Since 1975 investigative work financed by the ODA has been carried out 
into improved minimum - tillage systems through three associated 
projects. The Dryland Farming Research Scheme (DFRS), based at Sebele 
Research Station, was established "to study the factors limiting arable 
crop production and to develop tillage systems and machinery capable 
of increasing yields". This investigation could then be carried further 
under the Evaluation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements 
Project (EFSAIP), also at Sebele, but established for subsequent 
evaluation of research findings in cooperation with farmers on their 
own holdings. Finally, the Integrated Farming Pilot Project (IFPP) 
has been examining the impact of the recommended system in a combined 
arable and livestock community of 330 households at Pelotshetla in 
Southern District.
A great deal of effort was centred initially upon the rnakgonatsotlhe, 
a multi-purpose tool bar which represents an impressive attempt at local 
development of appropriate technology aimed at reducing the draught 
power requirement to two oxen. In the event this proved something of 
a red herring, since it still required 6 oxen for ploughing purposes,
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experienced problems with its planter component, and was too expensive 
at P700 for the categories of farmer for which it was designed.
While this element of research and development diverted the 
IFPP from its primary objective of implementing improved approaches, 
a fairly definite technological package has now emerged from the 
experience of IFPP, even if some experimentation continues and 
improvements are still under way, a package comprising a mouldboard
plough, Safim planter and cultivator (for weeding), together costing
13P250. Planters and cultivators are in use among all of the 100 or so 
participating farmers at Pelotshetla, with sufficiently positive results, 
to concentrate now on widening access to this technology.
Just as important is a shift from spring ploughing at the time of 
the rains in October/November to autumn ploughing in March/April or 
winter ploughing in June/July. This implies a break with the traditional 
seasonal migration between the villages and lands, the 'circle of 
inefficiency' described earlier. The effects of this shift, together 
with the technological package, have been tested at Pelotshetla and 
under EFSAIP. Unfortunately sample sizes are far too small for any 
very strong conclusions to be drawn, small not only in terms of farmers 
but in terms of years, given that the impact of improved systems is 
.likely to differ as between good and bad years.
Table 16 compares performance in kg/ha for the traditional 
(broadcasting) system with spring ploughing at the time of the rains, 
the "improved traditional system" with winter and spring ploughing, 
and use of a Safim planter, and finally the makgonasotl’no, used in the 
same sequence. The evidence (on one year's result only) suggests that 
the 'improved traditional system' is at least as good as the makgonatsotlii*'1, 
although it is a considerably cheaper package. The important comparison 
now, however, is between the improved system and the traditional: here 
we can comb ne the results for 'improved traditional' and 'makgonafpo] lie 
since they are both based on winter ploughing, row planting and better 
weeding and differ mainly in terms of the cost of the equipment. The 
improved methods appear to have a very clear advantage over the traditional.
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Table 3 i>. Average Yields (kg/ha) at the IFPP with Alternative Methods 
of Production (figures in brackets give number of farmers 
in sample)
Traditional Improved
Traditional
Makgonatsotlhe
Maize
1976-77 358 (53) 825 (25)
1977-78 204 (6 2) 762 (16) 599 (28)
Sorghum
1976-77 142 (52) - 522 (29)
1977-78 116 (55) 347 (11) 200 (18)
Sunflower
1976-77 350 (7) - 229 (1)
1977-78 185 (13) 362 (1)
.1
560 (5)
Output/ha/man-hour 
Maize
(kg)
3 .52 6.86 2.89
Sorghum 1.77 2.41 1.00
Moreover this relates only to yield per hectare: we are not told
whether farmers were enabled to plough greater hectarages by being able 
to take fuller advantage of the rains, as would be expected with the 
improved systems.
The last two rows show, on the basis of estimated labour require­
ments, what the average return to labour was/ measured in output per 
hectare per man-hour, in the three cases. The makgonatsotlhe system 
required more labour, reducing its return, but the 'improved tradi­
tional1 gave a higher return, due to significantly greater yields.
The data refers only to average yields, but in bad years results 
under the traditional system were much more widely spread between 
farmers, some obtaining satisfactory results but a long 'tail' of 
farmers obtaining no yield at all. The improved system thus appears 
to give an important degree of insurance against bad years.
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Table IV . Average Yields of Sorghum (kg/ha)at EFSAIP with A1 teruai i vi M< limbs 
of Production (figures are for nil fertilizer application; 
figures in brackets give number of farmers in sample).
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
Control plots 305 243(25) 52(14)
SMP 122 186(10) 44 (5)
AMP 1 ('Safim planters) 378 . 259 (8) 467(1)
AMP 2 (Plough/planting) - 1138 (2) 831(1)
AMP 3 (EFSAIP planters) - - 272 (3)
Table 11 gives data based on much smaller samples of farmers 
under the EFSAIP for the traditional system of spring mouldboard 
ploughing (SMP). The figures are for mean yields/hectare of sorghum 
with nil fertilizer application. Autumn mouldboard ploughing with a 
Safim planter, with ordinary plough/planting (by hand over a third 
furrow) and with an EFSAIP planter, labelled respectively AMP^, AMP 
and AMP1( are compared with SMP and a given number of control plots of 
traditionally planted sorghum.
Once again, the improved packages showed considerably increased 
yields over the traditional system. More encouraging still, the 
difference was even more marked in the drought year of 1978-79 when 
yields under the traditional system were extremely poor on the average 
(and thus zero for a great many farmers), confirming the results from 
IFPP.
Unfortunately the experiments have not been carried out in such 
a way that we can distinguish between the effects o'f the planter/cult- 
ivator package itself and those of winter/autumn ploughing. It will 
be noticed that in Table 17 the yields for ordinary plough/planting 
in a third furrow, compared to both Safim and ESAIP planters, were much 
greater - although conclusions cannot be drawn from such a minuscule 
sample.
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This is of the utmost importance. Should investment be directed 
towards the distribution of planters/cultivators (generally to those 
who are already equipped with oxen and are in a position to plough 
in the lands in winter/autumn)or towards improving water supplies in 
the lands areas in order to permit a larger proportion to winter/ 
autumn plough?
According to Roe (19SO) the second category of investment has been 
neglected over a long period, particularly because of a livestock bias:
"The separation of lands and cattle posts, in particular, 
decisively structured the access to improved water supplies 
in the lands areas. Borehole drilling was from the very 
first identified with livestock production and, as such, 
boreholes were located largely in grazing areas or at 
sandveld cattle posts. The resulting comparative shortage 
of permanent water supplies in the lands areas had the effect 
of all the more reinforcing the dependency of agriculture 
on the livestock sector"(pp. 26-27).
Moreover^ i
"The livestock sector was subsidized, through the use of 
government funds which favoured livestock development 
over agriculture, namely, the large-scale programs for 
sinking rural water supplies. Had the livestock sector 
borne the full cost of its development, investment in 
agriculture might well have looked more appealing"(p.29).
The development of arable agriculture has thus been positively held back
over a long period of time, as a result of concentration on livestock
14production. The question of this comparative subsidy is considered 
again later in this paper.
There remains the immediate issue of water investment versus the 
technological package. The lack of firm evidence on which to base a
decision here is awkward. A Ministry of Agriculture paper of September,
131979, indicates a figure of some 5,000 or 6,000 single row planters 
and cultivators to be distributed over a five - year period, and a 
figure as high as 10,000 has been mentioned. Given the supplementary 
costs of distribution and monitoring which have to be added to the cost 
of the equipment itself, this represented the most expensive specific 
project directed at the arable farmers in the Hardveld under ALDEP at 
that moment in time.
ALDEP plans to focus upon "those farmers cultivating between 0 and 
1510 hectares" , an estimated 90 per cent of all landed rural households, 
the intention being that these should cultivate some 6 - 7  hectares out 
of cultivable areas of 10 ha. If we look back to Table 13, however, 
we see that about 80 per cent of land holders planted less than 6 ha. 
in 1971-72 and over 60 per cent less than 4 ha. The number already 
planting the necessary hectarage, and thus with the basic resources 
already-with which to aim at increased yields through improved manage­
ment and equipment may be limited. A much larger proportion may need 
to be given the resources to expand their cultivated hectarages. In 
terms of immediate need, at least, ALDEP may not be focussing on the 
most obvious target group. If the programme concentrates on the 
distribution of planters and cultivators, with accompanying extensions, 
to farmers already cultivating 6 - 7  ha, a very large proportion of 
farmers could certainly be missed; conversely, if there is concen­
tration on the majority of farmers in the 1 - 5 ha. range, this must 
divert effort from the straight - forward package which has been 
identi fied.
To put this another way, the package is not immediately relevant 
to those householders who lack draught power, estimated by ALDEP to 
be in excess of 33,000.^^ Credit for the acquisition of oxen and a 
donkey distribution scheme (for draught power) under ALDEP are under 
discussion. The question is whether this will receive as much attention 
or be capable of being as rapidly implemented as the distribution of 
the technological package. A suggestion by Lipton (1978,Vol.1, p.182) fo 
the purchase of cattle from large owners for distribution to those 
without has not met much response. In situations where there is general 
overgrazing any scheme which involves actual assistance for acquisition 
of cattle is invariably resisted, but little is done to control large 
individual accumulations of cattle which contribute most to overgrazing.
There is some danger, therefore, that the ALDEP package as it 
stands could lead to stratification of the rural economy (which is 
already proceeding apace with the spt ad of tractors), with some 10 or 
20 per cent of "yeoman" farmers dominating the rural scene. Already 
of course, there is a strong division between those with and those 
without draught power, reflected particularly in the share cropping 
system referred to earlier. Because the former have, as it were,
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just one hurdle to jump rather than two, the logistics of distribut ion 
to these farmers will be much more simple.
This could be aggravated by the extension strategy which it is
suggested might be adopted under ALDEP. A step-by-step adoption of
the technological/management package is proposed as follows:
1. Step 1: third furrow hand planting, followed by a cultivator, with
the application of kraal manure on one quarter of the unit.
2. Step 2: use of planter/cultivator.
3. Step 3: introduction of fertilizers on part of the cropped area,
and the use of certified seed on two hectares.
4. Step 4: achieved when the full package of improved practices is
applied to the entire 6 ha. cultivated.
This may be associated with the revival of an old system of grading 
farmers in terms of progressiveness, referring to 'pupil', 'improved', 
'progressive' and 'master' farmer as Steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 are achieved. 
Yields of maize and sorghum for the four steps are anticipated to be 
as in Table 18. The figures for Step 4 are deduced from Step 3, applied 
now over the full area.
Table 1&. Proposed
ALDEP.
Step-by-step Increases in Farmer Productivity Unde:
Maize Sorghum
Yield Increase over Y ield Increase over
kg/ha Previous Steps kg/ha Previous Steps
kg/ha
S tep 0 300 150 300 150
S tep 1 4 50 50 4 50 50
S tep 2 500 500 500 300
Step 3 1,000 1 ,000? 800 600?
Step 4 2 ,000? 1,400?
Source: Ministry of Agriculture.
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A number of criticisms might be made of the step approach. Some 
of the assumed increases appear unrealistic. And the sequence appears 
to reflect the conventional feeling that, irrespective of the con­
ditions, farmers should progress towards the technical efficiency 
criterion of increasing yield per hectare, with the application of 
'modern' inputs. If fertilizers are not economic, however, as seems 
possible, it would not be likely or desirable that a farmer progress 
to Step 3. Thirdly, the sequence does not refer to those who lack 
draught power, where the objective would be to increase the number of 
hectares cultivated, rather than yield per hectare (it is assumed 
that increased output should only come at the intensive margin, not 
the extensive margin, possibly a fundamental misinterpretation of the 
situation) or the possibility of increases in yield among those who broadcast 
and thus do not figure in the sequence (including many who employ 
tractors!).
4
Finally, the system will almost inevitably encourage extension 
officers ("Agricultural Demonstrators" in Botswana) to focus attention 
on a more limited number of farmers, especially those with the greatest 
resources, taking this focus away from the poorest sections of the 
farming community. Related to this, it may divert emphasis away from
the group extension approach which it is also the intention to use.
17The group approach has a number of advantages: if homogeneous groups
are addressed and supervised collectively there is a greater chance 
of other members of the group following the innovators; the group 
approach must necessarily aim at the 'average' farmer.reducing the 
danger of inappropriate technical recommendations; and in the special 
context of Botswana where long distances are involved and contact with 
farmers circulating among several residences is particularly difficult, 
the group approach recommends itself most strongly.
Tractor s versus Oxen
The underlying assumption of the ALDEP programme is that the farmers 
involved would ox - plough. But the choice between oxen and tractors 
for draught power is not straightforward. In the Barolongs tractorization 
is now the predominant form, and large scale methods and improved farming 
techniques have made the area the country's main producer of marketed 
grain. The terrain of the Barolongs is not representative of the 
Hardveld as a whole, but against this it is estimated that in Botswana
as a whole some 15 or 20 per cent of the households which plough do not 
use animal draught, and the proportion using tractors is increasing
i . . . . 18slightly.
However, the increase in fuel prices has drastically raised the 
cost of tractor - ploughing to a current level of about 20 to 25 Pula 
per hectare. Without some form of tractor - sharing, at the very least, 
this would appear to make tractors uneconomic in the case of the large 
mass of producers with small acreages producing comparatively small 
surpluses of not very high - priced crops. Even the acquisition of 
tractors by larger farmers is not categoric evidence of profitability: 
the highest rate of default on National Development Bank loans for 
agriculture is on loans to large borrowers for the acquisition of 
tractors and ancillary equipment. Reasons given include lack of 
business acumen, whereby owners underestimate costs and undercharge for 
tractor services; prestige motives, with tractors ‘purchased because 
people have funds available rather than themselves creating wealth 
(only about two-thirds of the tractors are said to be actually used in 
agriculture at all, perhaps in part a result of high running costs);
and lack of servicing facilities available locally to the tractor
19owners, creating a problem of maintenance and use.
It is important in any case to make a clear distinction between 
the economics of tractors in large-farm situations and small-farm 
situations. Given access to a large tract of land, tractors can 
certainly be highly profitable for the private operator, while large- 
scale commercial farming using tractors, as in the Barolongs, can 
make an important contribution to one social goal in Botswana, that 
of increasing marketed output and reducing the necessity of expensive 
importation of basic foodstuffs. However, because large-scale 
production would create very little employment and do little to spread 
incomes, it is out of the question for Botswana to pursue this 
single objective; as we have seen a major objective has to be to 
create employment and increase incomes in the small-scale arable 
sector/ in order that this sector can support the majority of rural 
households. Botswana has, therefore, to pursue a "multiple objective 
function", relying to an important extent on the commercial sector for
commercial output perhaps and simultaneously increasing small-scale 
production, partly for own-account consumption and p>artly to permit 
small marketable surpluses for cash.
The question, therefore, is whether tractors can be made economic 
in the small-scale sector. Here also there are certainly some techni­
cal advantages in using tractors; they can make effective use of the 
high-potential areas of more clayey soils which occur throughout the 
Hardveld; elsewhere they make possible fuller use of the rains through 
improved timing of operations; and they are particularly useful for 
de-stumping, a particular problem for small farmers, including female- 
headed households. However, there are three sorts of considerations 
which determine whether or not tractors can be used within the small- 
scale sector of agriculture: technical, economic (the relative costs 
and productivity of capital and labour) and managerial. Poor 
management of tractors, whether in Government tractor hire service 
schemes or in larger or smaller-scale settlement schemes, has been 
the principal cause of failure in agriculture projects involving a 
tractor component in most countries south of the Sahara since the War.
The main disadvantage of ox-drawn cultivation, as opposed to 
tractors,are the enormous demands made for grazing; and this is 
likely to be an increasing factor as land pressure increases. At 
the moment the position is unclear. Several Districts claim that 
there is virtually no allocable land left in the area; others see no 
problems of shortages in the short run. Allocation of land, on the 
other hand, is not the same as utilization, and where in one District 
the local authorities reported that virtually all land had been 
allocated, aerial photography suggested that only one in seven 
agricultural plots had been utilized that season.
In the long run, the position could be altogether different.
This is suggested by some simple arithmetic, based on a calculation
>0 . made by the ALDEP team.'" Population projections indicate a rural
population of some 100,000 farm families in the year 2000. The
stated objective under ALDEP is that 60,000 of these would come under
the ALDEP farm improvement programme by that date, each of these
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planting 6 - 7  hectares and, with 3 - 4  hectares fallow, holding 10 
hectares of arable land in all.
We can first test the feasibility of this assumption. The ALDEP 
papers state land availability in the Eastern Hardveld to be 3.3 
million ha. of arable land and 1 million ha. of additional grazing 
land (these figures probably require verification). Rather than 
taking a uniform carrying capacity 1 LSU (Livestock Unit): 12 hectares, 
as in the ALDEP calculation, we take 1:8 for the arable land and 1:12 
for the grazing land, and for convenience convert the grazing land to 
arable land - equivalent by applying a factor of two-thirds. This 
gives the total supply of land as 4,167 thousand ha.
Suppose that 20 per cent of the ALDEP farmers (12,000) use tractor 
power and have no grazing requirement at the landq. The other 48,000 
ALDEP households each keep 8 oxen at the lands and require 8 x 8 = 64 
hectares for grazing, and 74 ha. in all. It would not be badly 
inconsistent with Table 13 to assume that the non - ALDEP households 
cultivate half the amount, 5 ha. (including fallow), and maintain 4 
cattle in the area. This would require 37- ha. per household. Demand 
for land would then be 120, 3552, and 2960 thousand ha. for users of 
tractor power, for other ALDEP households, and for non - ALDEP house­
holds, or 6,632 thousand ha. altogether. Given the supply of land 
of 4,167 thousand ha., this implies a huge deficit of 2,465 thousand.
Alternatively, starting from the amount of land which is available 
(4,167 - 120 = 4,047 thousand, excluding the land cultivated by 
tractor users), let X = no. of ALDEP households (excluding tractor 
users) and Y = no- of non - ALDEP households', both in thousands, so 
that
X + Y = 88 
Land will be fully used up when
74X + 37Y = 4,047 
giving X = 21.4, Y = 66. 6
This implies 33,400 farmers under ALDEP, of which 12,000 use tractor
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powoi and 2], 400 oxen, and 66,600 farmers m e  lei I mil ul the nlieim .
This comparatively large proportion, two-thirds, of households 
planting no more than 2 or 3 hectares per annum, is clearly unsatis­
factory. Without the tractor power component, land would be fully 
utilized with only 1.2,600 farmers included under ALDEP (with the 
same assumptions), and 87,400 outside the scheme.
The implication is that there might be a possibly quite sharp 
increase in the real or shadow price of land. This would not 
necessarily make tractorization economic: fuel and maintenance costs 
would remain high. But it would reduce the feasibility of the alter­
native, ox cultivation.
The other implication is a possibly quite serious increase in
the stratification of the rural economy (already proceeding apace
with the spread of tractors), with some 10 or 20 per cent of yeoman.1
farmers dominating the rural scene. The rise in the demand for and 
price of land would stimulate the extension of 'sharecropping', 
increasing the squeeze on less viable farm units, including female­
headed households.
The assumptions underlying the above calculations are, of course, 
extremely rough. More than this amount of land might be available.
On the other hand it is assumed that supplementary cattle required for 
regenerating the ox team are kept elsewhere, and that livestock - keepers 
keep out of the areas earmarked for arable farmers. What produces the 
rather surprising result is a rather peculiar combination of 
circumstances: an att>. mpt to cultivate where yields are low so that 
oxen are needed to expand acreage; but where* even the cattle - carrying 
capacity is low, requiring a large number of hectares to sustain the 
oxen. What is needed to break the circle is either the intensification 
of cattle feeding, to reduce grazing area per LSU, which appears 
uncertain, oi a moans of reducing the number of oxen required for ploughing 
which was oik* of the objectives of the makgonatsotlhe , or the subst it til ion of 
t.ractoi services for oxen, particularly for weaker households: which raises 
all tlie problems of management referred to earlier.
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The_ Relative Profitability of Livestock and Arabic Farming _\u_ L_< >1 sw. n 1.1: 
Private versus Social Considorations.
Livestock - keeping has always been a much more attractive economic 
activity than arable production in Botswana, as shown for example by 
the rapid increase in the national herd from lh million in 1966 to some 
3k million or more in 1979. Small farmers who concentrate on arable 
production do so principally because they lack the assets to go into 
more lucrative livestock - keeping; and where surpluses are made in 
arable production, profits are frequently put into cattle, investment 
at the farm level being generally livestock - oriented. In contrast 
arable production in Botswana affords only low yields, an uncertain 
market for any surpluses, and is fraught with risk. Maize and sorghum 
are much more vulnerable to drought than cattle, and yields are frequently 
as low as zero even after considerable amounts of labour and effort have 
been expended, while at other times farmers may decide not to plant in 
the light of the emerging rainfall supply situation. When yields are 
more satisfactory this will still have required a considerable input of 
labour, especially compared to livestock activity. Though the distances 
involved daily in trekking cattle between water and grazing may be 
substantial, this work does not increase in proportion to herd size, 
and is therefore not labour-intensive. Hence success in livestock - 
rearing is not so much a matter of labour effort as of initial wealth, 
wealth from other sources such as mining wages,' or civil service salaries, 
luck, and access to water, perhaps, or grazing.
No systematic calculation has been made as yet of the relative 
profitabilities of the two activities. One specific calculation by the 
IFPP Farm Management and Statistics Section in its 1977-78 Report gives 
estimates of total gross margin on an Qh ha plot of traditionally grown 
crops as P133; for the same area under the 'Improved traditional system' 
as P250; and from livestock production P283. The figures are of course 
based on specific assumptions.
Given the riskiness, low yields, and low relative profitability of 
small - scale arable farming, it may be asked why Botswana should not 
concentrate much more on livestock production, and use exports of 
livestock products to pay for imported cereals (as Table 14 suggests 
individual farmers regularly do). The reasons are two-fold. First 
of all, due to current and imminent overgrazing, as
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well as to the predictions of land shortage made previously, the 
national herd may be considered to have reached its limit already in 
aggregate (although a change in the size distribution of holdings 
within this total would no doubt increase welfare.) In this situation 
private benefit from increases in cattle holdings will not be matched 
by any social benefit, the increases being offset by a corresponding 
decrease in the number of other people's cattle which can be supported.
The increase in social output may even be negative if there is a 
deterioration in the range which actually reduces its long run carrying 
capacity.
The second aspect is that, unless large sections of the population
in Botswana are to receive unemployment benefit, a mix of economic
activities is required which affords an adequate level of employment:
but while arable farming employs people, cattle - rearing in general
does not. Indeed some 80 per cent of the rural population are dependent
upon arable farming, irrespective of the low quality of life which this
occupation affords for a large proportion. Because of the low labour -
intensity of livestock production, even if the national herd were not 
21at its limit, increased livestock production could not absorb the number 
of rural households involved.
We may add a third consideration. While in the past, livestock 
has been Botswana's principal export and foreign exchange earner, mining 
revenue lias now more than equalled it in this respect, and prospects 
indicate that mining by itself can largely take care of Botswana's 
foreign exchange requirement in the future. In fact in the Botswana 
context mining and livestock production have similar characteristics, 
in different degrees, in that both are good foreign exchange earners 
but neither create a great deal of employment. The difference is that 
mining is not land - intensive, whereas livestock - production may 
actually divert scarce land production away from arable farming.
Increases in mining revenue thus reduce the need for a livestock emphasis, 
even if livestock - rearing may be a superior earner of income than 
arable production.
Taking all the above considerations together, we need in cost 
benefit terminology to apply a low shadow price of foreign exchange 
to livestock production, and take account of high external diseconomies 
from overgrazing involving an immediate or eventual reduction in cattle 
numbers elsewhere. At the same time a high premium on employment 
creation should be applied, implying a zero or even negative shadow 
price of labour.
If the above considerations are valid, it would be desirable to 
have a structure of relative prices and subsidies designed to promote 
arable agriculture and to reduce the (private) attractiveness of 
livestock production, and perhaps specifically to foster some kind of 
mixed farm pattern which affords income, employment and a balanced 
consumption pattern, and which is not ’land - hungry'. The price/ 
subsidy structure should be such that this farm pattern is not 
unbalanced over time by a disequilibrating accumulation of cattle.
The actual pattern of prices and subsidies has, largely uninten­
tionally, been very different from this. The policy with regard to 
arable production has been described as one of 'minimum intervention' 
and involves very little subsidy. The prices of grain are fixed by the 
Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) at a competitive replacement 
price i.e. import parity. Few arable inputs are subsidized. ALDEP 
proposals for subsidizing agricultural implements and draught power, 
e.g. via a donkey distribution scheme are not yet at the implementation 
stage. Seeds are not subsidized save in abnormal years and fertilizer 
subsidies (which would in case benefit better-to-do farmers) were 
discontinued in 1975. At the same time little or no credit has been 
offered to small arable farmers so far via the National Development 
Bank or the commercial banks, whereas these have found it cosier to 
make loans on a quite substantial scale to the livestock sector, 
particularly the large - scale commercial ranching sector, which has 
also benefited from infrastructural and other investment under the 
World Bank's Second Livestock Development Programme. Finally arable 
production has also suffered from lack of marketing facilities due to 
the underdeveloped system of local markets and the limited national 
purchasing network of BAMB. Long distances and poor roads are more of 
a problem for low-value grain production compared to livestock which
can be more easily trekked to marketing points.
In contrast livestock production has received a massive disguised 
subsidy through the differential access given to Botswana livestock
products by the EEC, an indirect form of foreign assistance which has
22benefited livestock producers, particularly larger ones. At the
same time there has been since 1964 or so massive investment, public 
and private, in boreholes and dams for the livestock sector: investment 
which has in fact underlain the rapid increase in livestock numbers 
which occurred. This investment has generally included a major element 
of subsidy. Considerable bank lending has been made for the construction 
of private boreholes which has been of greatest benefit to larger live­
stock owners in both communal and commercial areas. TGLP has inevitably 
meant further assistance to these in the fora of grants and loans. TGLP, 
of course, enjoyed a head start on the ALDEP under which assistance to 
arable producers is now being considered. In any case,, of the total 
capital allocation of P.23.1 million for agricultural development in 
the current 5- year plan, 1976-81, P.17.7 million or 73 per cent was 
for livestock - related projects (Egner, 1979) .
Given the level of food imports from South Africa, an argument 
from economic theory for protection of arable production could be 
employed as follows. Since land (if not absorbed by livestock) and 
labour resources in agriculture are not fully employed in Botswana, a 
degree of protection from South African imports, while raising food 
prices and reducing consumers' surplus to some extent, would create
additional income and employment in agriculture, with a net benefit
23overall. Since direct protection is not possible within the context
of the Customs Union agreement, a way of taking advantage of the avail­
able mineral income tax revenue would be to support or subsidize agri­
culture by fairly generous expenditure on agricultural credit schemes, 
research, local road transport, and even agricultural price support 
schemes, especially support schemes which offer support in periods 
of drought, such as loan re-scheduling.
Since measures to increase grain output prices would benefit most 
the commercial farming sector and least small farmers with only small 
and periodic marketable surpluses, a more equitable procedure is to 
subsidize inputs, and particularly inputs employed by small farmers.
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The intention under ALDEP is, in fact, to provide a 30 per cent subsidy 
on planters and cultivators, as well as generous subsidies on a wide 
range of other inputs. As discussed already, it is not certain that 
the ALDEP technological package will reach the poorest farm householders. 
The most obvious candidate for subsidy is seed production and distribut ion 
revealed by the Study of Constraints to be one of the most serious 
problems facing both sub-marginal farmers and farmers aiming at 
marketable surpluses. Shortage of seed is regressive in its impact 
on farmers affecting the poorest and most vunerable households in 
greatest degree.
It could be, of course, with rising prices of tractors and 
fuel for tractor - ploughing and eventually a rising shadow price of 
land required for grazing oxen, that domestic arable production is 
simply uneconomic as compared to the option of importing. Or that at 
least production by the more marginal farming households is non - 
competitive, requiring (to consumers) very expensive protection if the 
main target group is to be assisted. This needs to be systematically 
investigated. If production were indeed proved to be uneconomic, the 
prospects would be poor indeed for providing any viable form of paid 
or self - employment for the mass of the population in Botswana as 
an alternative to state cash hand - outs of dole paid for by mineral 
revenue. A labour - intensive public works programme has already been 
launched in late 1979, to cost one million pula, and this may be sub­
stantially extended. So long as this can be directed to socially - 
productive ends, adding to national 'output1, it is valuable in itself.
We may, on the other hand, be seeing the start of a national system of 
dole financed by diamond revenues and necessitated by a failure to 
provide sufficient employment and income opportunities.
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Footnotes
1 . Heal growth slowed to din annual rate of something less than four 
per cent during the period 1973-78, but will accelerate again 
with the new mining development to be referred to presently.
2. These figures probably exaggerate the trend, the first lying below
the trend line and the second above, prior to the effects of tin1
next drought.
3. Report of the Special Programming Mission to Botswana, IFAD,
Rome, October 1979.
4. In addition to the approach to universal primary education 
already mentioned, about 85 per cent of the population was 
reportedly within 15 kilometres of a health facility in 1979.
5. At the current exchange rate of 1 Pula = $1,138 this would be 
worth $ 720
6 . It may be asked why this process does not lead over time to one 
large herd with a single owner. The answer may lie in the 
existence of diseconomies of scale to balance the economies
of scale posited, associated with the availability of water 
supplies or management and control of large ‘herds, or certain 
social factors inhibiting the accumulation of holdings beyond 
a certain point. The precise way in which the distribution of 
holdings is affected is is any case uncertain: it may be that the 
main impact is at the lower end of the distribution as the number 
of small owners who retain viable herds is reduced. For some 
discussion of social factors affecting the building up of viable 
small herds in Botswana, see Duggan "(1979) .
7. This may change under a new more area-based programme which is 
under discussion, the Communal Area Planning and Development 
Programme (CAPAD).
8. However both these primary-product industries have important 
potential for generating important secondary activity. In both 
cases it is worth drawing attention to the example of India.
Gems and jewellery emerged last year as India's most important 
export by value, exports having increased from Rs.400 million in 
1970-71 to Rs. 7,250 million in 1978-79, gross of substantial 
import content. This trade consists almost entirely of cut 
diamonds, where India now has a world monopoly in cutting small 
stones. The expansion of the Indian industry depends upon success 
in getting further access to an apparently tightly controlled world 
supply of roughs. Clearly Botswana would have this access, if
it could develop a trained labour force capable of competing with 
the Indian industry. The obvious advantage apart from the 
essential access to the basic material is that this activity 
would combine great labour-intensity with high value added.
India has also been able to develop village industry leather 
tanning and both village and factory production of leather goods, 
with substantial success in export markets. Botswana, and other 
pastoral economies such as Somalia, should have a major comparative 
advantage in these areas if,once again, they are able to deveiop 
a trained workforce.
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For some historical evidence on the negative impact ot South 
African competition see Roe (1980).
In this respect the alternative way of spreading overhead costs, 
is preferable, in that it leaves the farm in the control of the 
small farmer. The difficulty in this case is inability to pay, 
given the predominantly subsistence nature of the activities of 
the small farmers. The provision of donkey draught may have 
advantages here because of the lower capital cost involved.
An experiment to break this circle is under way for assisted 
construction of small dug-out dams at the lands homesteads 
which, if successful, could transform the situation.
In the RIDS 43 per cent of households designated a woman as 
head and 29 per cent did not have a male member of working age 
present in the household.
There is a difficulty with the Safim planter, which is not very 
satisfactory for sorghum. A new EFSAIP planter, incorporating 
parts of the Safim but which avoids this defect, is not yet on 
the production line in any quantity.
Historically, of course, there was no diamond revenue to offset 
the need to obtain foreign exchange earnings through the livestock 
economy.
ALDEP, 1979.
This estimate is based on the RIDS figure of 50 per cent of 
households owning less than 10 cattle. It is quite likely 
to be an overestimate: the exact size of the problem may be 
more accurately assessed through village-by-village inquiry 
as the programme is being implemented.
For some discussion of these in the context of Kenya, see Institute of 
Development Studies, Nairobi, occasional paper No.12, S.R.D.P. second 
overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme, 1975. 
ALDEP workshop paper, 1979
The Ministry of Agriculture has no Mechanical Field Service 
Division, while at the same time the private sector is not 
well developed.
ALDEP, 1979.
References to this limit assume the correctness of the widespread 
assumption that underground water availability does not permit 
further extension of grazing on the established pattern, something 
which requires substantiation by systematic investigation.
One estimate (Egner, 1979) was that, with EEC prices for Botswana 
beef at 25-30 per cent above world market prices combined EEC 
and government subsidies to the cattle industry might be running 
at P.25 million per annum.
This is the same argument once used by Dudley Seers ( 1959) as a 
possible argument for more permanent rather than infant-indust.ry 
protection of manaufacturing.
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